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9
The Reshaping of Economic
Markets and the State
Economic Crisis and State Changes
Mark Thatcher
The relationship between the state and economic markets lies at the heart of
debates about the power and role and indeed nature of the state in capitalist
societies. In an era of strong neoliberal rhetoric about ‘rolling back the state’,
‘cutting red tape’, and ‘freeing markets’, it is too easy to lose sight of the fact
that views of the state’s role have evolved over time in comparative political
economy, that such rhetoric may differ from actual policies and institutions,
and also that the state and market are highly intertwined.
Moreover, while much attention in political economy has been focused on how
the state affects markets—negatively or positively—less attention has been given
to how state roles in shaping markets inﬂuence the nature of the state. This
chapter explicitly addresses this issue, looking both at how the state has sought to
alter economic markets and conversely how such efforts have involved modiﬁ-
cation of the state. It focuses in particular on functions of providing services and
funding, inﬂuencing market structures and outcomes, and long-term planning.
The dominant academic literature underlines moves away from traditional
post-1945 structures, ownership, and functions that saw the political execu-
tives play direct roles in markets towards an indirect or regulatory state.
However, the chapter argues that this view omits the continuing direct role
of the state. Indeed, economic developments, especially the recent crises after
2000, have revealed and revived the continuing direct roles of the state—as
owner, as policy leader, and through direct interventions—and sometimes led
to increases in these. What has changed in relation to previous periods,
however, is that the state’s direct role sometimes takes new forms and uses
different policy instruments, and is layered on to more indirect forms of state
shaping of markets. States are being transformed into both regulators and
direct participants at national and international levels.
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The chapter focuses especially on state actors themselves—elected politi-
cians and unelected ofﬁcials inside central government and elsewhere—and
therefore takes the state as an active participant in decisions about its own
form and structure. It does not treat ‘the state’ as a uniﬁed entity—rather, it
follows the editors in Chapter 1, and looks at different actors within the state.
In particular, it distinguishes between political executives (elected politicians
and their ofﬁcials) and non-majoritarian institutions, notably independent
central banks and independent regulatory agencies. Its main focus is indus-
trialized countries. It begins with a discussion of the move towards the indirect
governance or the regulatory state, and especially its analysis of the state.
Thereafter, it offers a critique, using recent ‘statist’ work, before offering
empirical examples of the continuing or even increased direct role of the
state in shaping markets, and the implications for its ownership, structure,
and functions, as well as explanatory factors for this role. It ends by offering an
overview of the state that combines direct and indirect roles, and contrasts it
with major analyses of the move towards ‘the regulatory state’.
ANALYSES OF THE MOVE TO THE INDIRECT
STATE OR REGULATORY STATE
Literature in comparative political economy in the 1960s and 1970s under-
lined the growth of the state’s direct role in markets after 1945 (cf. Shonﬁeld
1965, Hayward and Watson 1975). It pointed to the size, structures, and
functions played by political executives in Europe in shaping markets. The
state (often national governments, but also regional and local authorities)
owned major ﬁrms and indeed entire industries such as network industries
and ‘strategic industries’, notably coal, steel, shipbuilding, and cars, as well as
ﬁnance. Nationalization of major industries took place, not only in the
immediate aftermath of the Second World War but also at other times—
for example, the 1970s in Britain (under both Labour and Conservative
governments) or the early 1980s in France (after the victory of the Left in
1981). In many sectors, especially network industries, these state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) enjoyed a legal monopoly. In other sectors, such as
banking and other parts of ﬁnance or parts of the media, the state effectively
created oligopolies by formally or informally licensed ﬁrms and/or ﬁnancing
and supporting a small number of ﬁrms. Finally, in Europe, most
powers were, at least nominally, in the hands of elected politicians—often
central governments (e.g. in the UK and France) but sometimes also
regional or municipal ones (e.g. Germany, or in the case of water and
sometimes energy).
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Of course cross-national, cross-sectoral, and temporal differences existed.
Work on statism, planning, and corporatism contrasted the capacity of the
French state with less statist countries such as Britain, or the coordination that
took place in Germany and many Nordic countries (Shonﬁeld 1965,Wilks and
Wright 1987, cf. Dyson 1980). In general, countries with stronger states were
seen as more successful in industrial policy (Zysman 1977, Dyson and Wilks
1983, cf. Cawson et al. 1990). Grands projets in France were the epitome of the
‘strong state’, able to lead long-term projects supported by state ﬁnance and
bringing in private and publicly owned suppliers, in sectors such as telecom-
munications nuclear energy, high-speed trains, and aerospace (Cohen 1992,
Muller 1989, Hayward 1995). The US was the most ‘exceptional’ case among
industrialized countries, being marked by ‘regulation’ (a term rarely applied in
Europe, where concepts such as industrial policy were more common), due to
low levels of public ownership of suppliers, the existence of more formalized
rules governing supply, and the existence of a number of ‘independent regu-
latory agencies’ or ‘commissions’ (e.g. the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion or the Federal Communications Commission). Nevertheless, in most
countries in Western Europe the state was a major direct actor in supporting
national champion ﬁrms in many sectors. ‘Neoliberal’ critics were rare and
largely marginal (cf. Schmidt and Thatcher 2013). Indeed, economic liberal-
ism seemed an outdated doctrine.
However, from the 1980s onwards, economic markets and understandings
of such markets altered sharply. Studies underlined changing economic con-
ditions such as oil crises, stagﬂation, and ﬁscal constraints, and then in the
1990s vastly increased capital mobility and ‘economic globalization’ or at least
internationalization. Equally, ‘liberal’ economic policies such as free trade,
capital mobility, or ﬂoating exchange rates spread (Simmons and Elkins 2004,
Simmons et al. 2006, cf. Streeck and Thelen 2005). Ideas too altered, as
Keynesian demand management became unfashionable and was seen as
difﬁcult to implement. There were disagreements about the extent of change
and its novelty historically, especially over the concept of ‘globalization’ (Hirst
and Thompson 1999), but less about its direction. Naturally, state policies
contributed to the changes in markets—but here our interest is in how these
affected or fed back into the state’s role in economic markets.
In the face of such economic liberalism or ‘neoliberalism’, analyses under-
lined a transformation of the state’s structure and role in markets, away from
direct roles in shaping markets (Wright 1994). Early analyses talked of the
‘retreat of the state’ or the ‘powerless state’ in the face of economic globaliza-
tion’ (cf. Strange 1988, 1996, Andrews 1994). Others saw ‘the state versus
the market’, presenting the two as opposed modes of governing economic
exchange. Equally, the concept of ‘deregulation’ became popular. However,
such analyses, reﬂecting political rhetoric, were rapidly criticized and met
major problems: far from retreating, the state appeared to be highly involved
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in reshaping markets, notably through forms of privatization and reregulation
(Muller and Wright 1994); not only was the existence of economic globaliza-
tion challenged (Hirst and Thompson 1999), but claims that it rendered the
state ‘powerless’ and drove state policies and structures to a ‘liberal state’ were
rapidly and strongly countered (Weiss 1998, Garrett 1998).
Later studies offered more sophisticated approaches. Two are selected both
because they illustrate changing views of the state and because of their
importance. Work on varieties of capitalism suggested that in the face of
‘economic globalization’, countries would maintain their distinctive national
institutions, rather than converge on one model (e.g. Hall and Soskice 2001).
Initial versions, however, were striking in their treatment of the state, which
was largely absent from the two stylized models—liberal market economies
and coordinated market economies—or at best in the background, supporting
ﬁrm-centred institutions (for critiques, see e.g. Crouch and Farrell 2004,
Crouch 2005).
In the face of powerful criticisms, varieties of capitalism work began to give
greater attention to the state, through acknowledgement of the state’s role in
liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies, both by
looking at whether the state played a direct or arm’s-length role and through
the development of other varieties such as ‘state-inﬂuenced market economies’
or ‘mixed market economies’ (Hancké et al. 2007, Schmidt 2002, 2003).
Nevertheless, the state’s role in shaping economic markets in the face of
economic changes was seen as becoming more difﬁcult, and indeed likely to
be unsuccessful (e.g. in mixed market economies, Molina and Rhodes 2007).
Indeed, analyses suggested a move away from direct intervention towards
more direct forms, with even France becoming seen as a non-Etatist country,
or at least using ‘faire-faire’ or ‘faire avec’ rather than ‘faire’ (Hancké et al.
2007, Schmidt 2009).
Perhaps the most sophisticated analyses concerned the state and regula-
tion. They started from the argument that the state remains deeply involved
in markets, but that the form of its activities have become more indirect,
and especially regulatory. Indeed, as competition spreads, so state regula-
tory activities have grown—‘freer markets, more rules’ (Vogel 1996).
Giandomenico Majone’s highly inﬂuential studies (Majone 1994, 1996, 1997)
argued that ‘the regulatory state’ had replaced the ‘positive state’ due to changing
international economic conditions, European integration, and the perceived
failure of public ownership and Keynesianism. The ‘positive state’ involved
state activities and political conﬂicts being centred on redistribution, notably
through ﬁscal policy, with the key role played by the executive and especially
ministerial departments, and with them political parties and civil servants.
Policymaking was often undertaken by a small number of actors, and indeed
the dominant style is frequently corporatist. In contrast, the regulatory state’s
core activity is rule-making, especially as competition is extended. Indeed,
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much regulation is focused on competition. The role of the central executive is
reduced, at least relative to other major institutions such as the EU and
independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), as well as experts and judges. Policy-
making occurs through a rule-bound culture, but with much greater pluralism
as many more actors, especially single-issue movements and experts and regu-
lators, participate. Although Majone accepted that the speed of change might
differ across polities (notably being strongest at the EU level), his central claim
was that the EU and national states were moving towards the more indirect
regulatory state roles.
AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW: THE CONTINUING
DIRECT ROLES OF THE STATE
Claims of an increasing move towards indirect state roles in markets have
substantial empirical support. Policymakers, especially at the national level,
engaged in ever-widening and spreading privatization from the 1980s on-
wards. From initially rather modest beginnings that were highly concentrated
in Britain (cf. Vickers and Wright 1989), privatization spread across European
countries, including ‘statist’ countries such as France or coordinated or cor-
poratist ones such as Germany (Obinger et al. 2013). Equally, it was extended
to long-standing state-owned sectors such as telecommunications, energy,
postal services, and stock exchanges (Thatcher 2007). Governments from
both left and right engaged in sales of SOEs. At the same time, the structure
of the state has been substantially altered through the creation of independent
regulatory authorities, and more generally delegation to non-majoritarian
institutions (Thatcher 2002, 2005, Gilardi 2008). IRAs have been given
substantial powers over the nature of competition, from licensing to price
controls. Their duties have often centred on the promotion of competition.
State functions within markets seem to have altered. At least four major
state functions or roles can be identiﬁed and analysed: providing services
or funding; inﬂuencing market structure; inﬂuencing market outcomes
(e.g. prices, range of services, etc.); and long-term planning. For each of
these, there seems to have been signiﬁcant moves away from direct state
roles. With respect to directly providing services or funding, widespread
privatization has occurred in Europe (and elsewhere), with the sale of many
publicly owned companies in sectors such as the network industries, steel,
coal, and ﬁnance (Clifton et al. 2006, Schneider and Häge 2008, Thatcher
2007). State subsidies have met powerful EU and World Trade Organization
rules that limit their scope. Thus, for instance, state aid has been increasingly
regulated by the European Commission, which claimed to apply stringent tests
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(Smith 2001). Non-crisis-approved state aid has declined somewhat and is at
fairly low levels of under 1 per cent for the EU as a whole.1
In terms of market structure, traditional state monopolies in industries such
as telecommunications, energy, postal services, airlines, or even railways have
largely been ended by EU and national legislation (Thatcher 2007). Moreover,
the scope for state discretion and action over the ownership of private
companies has met legal constraints. Thus, after the 1989 European Merger
Control Regulation, most large mergers are decided by the European Com-
mission,2 so that, for example, in major industries such as banking, energy,
and telecommunications the Commission dealt with several hundred cases
between 1990 and 2010 (Thatcher 2014).3 Decisions are based on grounds of
promotion of competition, with little room for other factors such as promot-
ing favoured ﬁrms or state-planned industry restructuring. At the national
level, a similar process took place for many countries, which formalized
procedures and emphasized competition as the aim of policy and the criterion
of decision making rather than grands projet aims of developing large ﬁrms.
Traditional state controls over market outcomes have also been reduced.
Thus administered prices decided by elected politicians—either directly or
through ownership of suppliers—for goods and services have been eliminated
in most sectors. Instead, privately owned competing suppliers decide their
tariffs. Equally, medium-term plans and planning organizations have been
largely abolished. Indeed, ‘industrial policy’ became an increasingly unfash-
ionable concept. Thus state functions appeared to move towards regulating
competition and ‘steering’ markets rather than directly ‘rowing’ itself. The
changes are summarized in Table 9.1
However, the emphasis on the indirect role of the state, especially in the face
of internationalized and liberalized markets, has met with the development of
at least partial alternatives that seek to ‘bring the state back in’. In response to
1 European Commission data show that it was 0.67 per cent of EU GDP in 2000 and
0.52 per cent in 2012: <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/non_crisis_en.html>
accessed October 2014.
2 In 1989, limits of aggregate worldwide turnover of more than 5 billion ECU (European
Currency Unit) was lowered to 2.5 billion ECU and aggregate EU turnover of at least two of the
ﬁrms of over 250 million ECU were lowered to combined aggregate turnover in each of at least
three member states of 100 million ECU, with the turnover of at least two of the ﬁrms being more
than 25 million ECU and aggregate EU-wide turnover of at least two of the ﬁrms being 100
million ECU.
3 In contrast, national competition agencies dealt not only with the smaller mergers and
acquisitions but also fewer—for instance, between 2000 and 2007, the UK Competition Commis-
sion dealt with only two cases in banking, one in energy, and three in telecommunications; for
France, the ﬁgures were fourteen, seven, and twelve, whereas the Commission dealt with seventy,
125, and 123 cases—Annual Reports of the Competition Commission and Direction Générale de la
Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Répression des Fraudes, Ministère des Finances, and
European Commission: <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf> accessed June
2010 and <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases> accessed September 2013.
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claims that the state has been neglected in work on ‘varieties of capitalism’, a
growing literature in comparative political economy claims that far from being
diminished, the state ‘also rises’, notably by (re)structuring markets through
new regulatory instruments and forms of industrial policy (Levy 2006,
Schmidt 2009, Moran 2003, Block 2008). Such literature seeks to overcome
simple divisions between ‘statist’ and ‘non-statist’ countries or between state
intervention or non-intervention. Instead, it accepts that the state is deeply
implicated in structuring markets, and the interesting questions concern
which strategies and instruments the state adopts.
One example is an emerging literature on ‘economic nationalism’ or ‘eco-
nomic patriotism’ (Clift and Woll 2012: 318, cf. Rosamond 2012, Helleiner and
Pickel 2005). Studies on ‘economic nationalism’ point out that countries can
pursue ‘nationalist’ objectives but through means other than mercantilism,
including different forms of liberalization (Helleiner 2002). Work on ‘economic
patriotism’ argues that even if markets are highly exposed to cross-border trade
and capital ﬂows, the state can engage in ‘economic partiality’ that involves
policies that seek to aid domestic interests and/or discriminate economically
against territorial outsiders (Clift and Woll 2012: 318, cf. Rosamond 2012). It
can do so through protectionism, which seeks to preserve the status quo, or
alternatively through ‘liberal economic patriotism’ that opens up markets to
competition, but in ways that advantage domestic interests (Clift andWoll 2012:
316–17). Moreover, it can engage in ‘economic patriotism’ through different
instruments—not just for each state strategy, there are also choices of policy
‘target’ or instrument. Thus protectionism can take place through classic
barriers to trade that close markets to outsiders, or through measures to
favour domestic ﬁrms such as subsidies and regulation maintaining domestic
standards. ‘Liberal economic patriotism’ can occur through liberalizing select-
ively in certain domains where policymakers believe domestic ﬁrms enjoy a
strategic advantage or by reregulating with rules that are unfavourable to
overseas ﬁrms (Clift and Woll 2012: 316–17). The literature argues that an
‘economically patriotic’ or ‘economically nationalist’ state exists even in LMEs.
Recent ‘statist’ work is valuable in challenging the emphasis on the state as
merely a regulator of competition, and in distinguishing policy strategies from
Table 9.1 Apparent reductions in the state’s direct role in markets
State role Apparent reduction
Provision of services and funding Privatization of state-owned suppliers and banks; EU
regulation of state aid
Inﬂuencing market structure Legal liberalization of supply
Inﬂuencing market outcomes Prices set by privately owned companies
Long-term planning Abolition of medium-term plans and planning organizations
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policy instruments (cf. Le Galès and Lascoumes 2004)—the latter can change
even if the former do not. This chapter follows its line of argument and seeks
to take it further. It suggests that the ‘direct state’ remains alive and well in
economic markets. It argues that political executives—elected politicians and
their ofﬁcials—remain key actors in economic markets, and that they pursue
their strategies through old and new policy strategies. The direct features of
the state do not mean a loss of regulatory functions—rather, the latter have
been ‘layered’ on top (cf. Streeck and Thelen 2005).
In terms of direct state provision of goods and services, old instruments
remain, and sometimes have seen revivals. Thus although the privatization of
SOEs has continued in major domains (notably network sectors such as energy),
not only have large and often controlling state stakes remained (cf. Schneider
and Häge 2008), but also a converse process of direct and indirect national or
renationalization has also taken place. When large national suppliers have been
threatened with bankruptcy, nation-states have often stepped in and bought
shares. Already in the 2000s, the UK, despite being classed a ‘liberal market
economy’, rescued the private railway infrastructure operator Railtrack and the
government is now the proud owner of Network Rail (which from 2013 is
classed as part of the public sector). The ﬁnancial crisis of 2007/8 revealed the
state’s capacity to (re)nationalize large failing national companies. The most
prominent examples have arisen in the ﬁnancial sector, where states now own
minority or even majority stakes in large banks—for instance, Royal Bank of
Scotland/National Westminster and Lloyds in the UK. However, the movement
has extended to other sectors—for instance, in Italy La Poste has taken an
important stake in Alitalia, while in France there have been several attempts
(some implemented) to ‘remunicipalize’ local water concessions and discussions
of renationalizing the motorway operators. In the US, the ﬁnancial crisis
revealed that the state is in fact the legal owner of Fannie Mae and Fannie
Mac, despite legal ﬁctions of separation, and that when major ﬁrms such as
Chrysler or General Motors risk bankruptcy, it can and does nationalize them.4
At the same time, new forms of state ownership have emerged. For a start,
SOEs themselves have expanded by internationalizing, not just through
exporting (which has greatly expanded) but through taking over other, over-
seas suppliers. Hence for example, EDF (Electricité de France), which is
majority state-owned, has become the largest electricity company in Europe
(by market capitalization), having taken shares in several other large suppliers
(inside and outside Europe, including several privatized ﬁrms in the UK and
Germany, such as London Electricity and ENBW). Moreover, state ownership
can occur through public or semi-public holding companies and ‘investment
banks’. Thus, for example, the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti in Italy has taken
4 Although the 2008–9 purchase of shares in Chrysler was ended by their sale in 2011
to Fiat.
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stakes in major companies, both ﬁnancial (e.g. to rescue Monte Paschi di
Sienna bank) and industrial. Several Western countries have established new
‘sovereign wealth funds’ that buy shares in domestic ﬁrms—e.g. the Le Fonds
stratégique d’investissement (FSI, created 2008) and then Banque Publique
d’Investissement (2012) in France or the Italian Fondo Strategico (2011).
Comparative quantitative data on state ownership are difﬁcult to obtain,
especially in time series form. Moreover, data can be biased by incentives of
countries to hide it and/or the normative bias of many international organ-
izations against state ownership.5 Bearing these important caveats in mind,
one indicator of ‘state control’ is provided by the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) study of product market regulation.6
It shows a fairly signiﬁcant decline in state control between 1996 and 2003, but
thereafter a much more mixed pattern between 2008 and 2013—with some
countries showing increases (e.g. Ireland, Iceland, and New Zealand), others
stability (e.g. France and Belgium) and others continuing decline (e.g. Greece,
Spain, and Portugal). An OECD analysis of SOEs in 2012 shows signiﬁcant
continuing state ownership. Interestingly, there are no ﬁgures for the US,
which showed a small increase between 2003 and 2008. It would be fascinating
to see how state support for car ﬁrms and for large ﬁnancial institutions,
including banks, insurance companies (e.g. AIG), and house ﬁnancing (e.g.
Fannie Mae and Fannie Mac) were counted. However, it is a snapshot and
based on a survey of member states. Table 9.2 sets out the OECD’s ﬁgures for
Western countries.
However, it is indirect ownership and funding that may be larger than
visible state ownership. Already for the US in the 1990s, the importance of the
‘shadow state’ was noted (Light 1999). The shadow has lengthened since then,
thanks to different instruments, although by its nature it is very difﬁcult to
quantify. A key part is implicit state ownership through state guarantees. The
crisis of 2007/8 revealed that many ﬁnancial institutions enjoy de facto guar-
antees, which in some cases became de jure in times of need. Moreover,
important ﬁnancial instruments have also allowed the state to attempt (suc-
cessfully or otherwise) to inﬂuence lending. Governments have continued
direct state funding for ﬁrms. They have provided state aid to struggling
companies—from banks to car companies, plus other prominent examples
such as airlines and even France Télécom. State banks continue to offer
ﬁnance—not just well-established ones such as the Caisse des Dépôts et
5 For example, the OECD exhibits concerns about the ‘unfair’ advantages of state-owned
enterprises, their difﬁculties of corporate governance, or whether they lower efﬁciency—see
Kowalski et al. 2013 and OECD 2012—but does not exhibit similar levels of critical scrutiny
towards privately owned ﬁrms, for instance in the ﬁnancial sector, despite the prominent
part played by privately owned ﬁnancial ﬁrms in the ﬁnancial crisis after 2008.
6 Available at: <http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/oecddatasetonthesizeandcompositionofnation
alstate-ownedenterprisesectors.htm> accessed September 2014.
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Consignations (CDC) in France or the KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau)
in Germany, which is owned by the Federal and regional governments and
raises capital with a state guarantees, or the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti in Italy,
which has lent to large ﬁrms in difﬁculties, but also newly created institutions,
e.g. the recently established Banque Publique d’Investissement in France.
However, perhaps more importantly, they have created indirect instruments
such as state-supported ﬁnancing schemes for industry, be these in the form of
state-induced or monitored bank lending schemes (e.g. ‘project Merlin’ in the
UK, whereby the banks agreed targets for lending to small banks, in return for
Table 9.2 OECD data on state controls
Indicator STC: State control
Year 1998 2003 2008 2013
Country
Turkey 4.4233427 4.1465597 3.6556759 3.4363689
Greece 4.2409129 3.8082786 3.3257184 2.8197126
Portugal 4.0446529 3.4168065 2.8948812 2.1832292
Italy 3.8182473 3.1501875 2.5800891 2.1418452
Spain 3.6870742 2.4938581 2.1627815 1.8570992
France 3.4117589 2.8273253 2.4145327 2.3709273
Hungary 3.4020095 2.470068 2.0313101 2.0494869
Czech Republic 3.2754493 2.578126 2.1129861 1.9505452
Belgium 3.1581228 2.3452258 2.1467278 2.1918879
Austria 3.0901964 2.3328528 1.9499971 1.6704669
Switzerland 3.052331 2.7534988 2.6552005 2.6783919
Ireland 2.9985859 2.5049686 1.8368714 2.1243005
Poland 2.974679 3.569165 3.3164487 3.0631847
Netherlands 2.9651284 2.2766023 1.4395179 1.4332321
Norway 2.809582 2.1849089 2.19507 2.1297629
Finland 2.7476711 2.2599952 2.1791396 2.1329598
Korea 2.6031113 2.0955782 2.438935 2.4686151
Iceland 2.5986662 1.9277139 1.8387318 1.9684445
Mexico 2.583895 2.2847023 2.11689 2.0166087
Germany 2.5713673 2.1458712 1.9937351 1.8574901
Denmark 2.315362 1.8333026 2.0254462 1.9659157
Australia 2.2771125 1.5882808 2.2055373 1.9879792
Sweden 2.2054441 1.9095371 2.388495 2.2244525
Canada 2.1474288 2.0800376 1.9603789 1.9195344
Japan 1.8743045 1.6555464 1.9039646 1.8537081
United Kingdom 1.6806819 1.1534009 1.6318237 1.5711745
United States 1.6248317 1.4255412 1.5013731 —
New Zealand 1.1793106 1.5545529 1.9283354 2.061861
Non-OECD Member Economies — — — —
Slovenia — — 2.7422261 2.5027826
Slovak Republic — 3.0366666 2.3245091 2.3054862
Luxembourg — 2.6943362 2.3380041 2.4490461
Estonia — — 1.8073441 1.6063105
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which they were offered cheap Bank of England funding). Thus for instance,
central banks have accepted commercial paper as collateral assets. The sums
are enormous—for example, the UK banks pledged to lend almost £200 billion
(although the target was missed and includes lending that would have
occurred anyway). The European Central Bank (ECB) for its part, announced
in 2014 targeted longer-term reﬁnancing operations (LTROs), which began
with an offer of 400 billion euros in 2014 (and will grow over time), equivalent
to about 7 per cent of all bank lending in the Eurozone area, but whose terms
included lending conditions by the banks. Hence, far from reducing the size of
the state in terms of suppliers, the crisis has seen the development of new
instruments for direct and especially indirect state ownership, or at least the
assumption of risks of supposedly ‘private’ ﬁrms, often away from the balance
sheets of governments.
Although direct and visible state aid remains limited, governments have
engaged in strong ‘tax competition’, seeking to offer the lowest tax rates to
attract multinational ﬁrms, as well as aiding ﬁrms in general. Sometimes this has
been part of public political strategies, and has even involved explicit
redistribution—for instance, the Conservative-Liberal government in the UK
reduced corporation tax rates and offered schemes such as the ‘patent box’ that
permit ﬁrms to reduce taxes while also seeking to cut public spending, especially
on welfare spending, while in France, François Hollande has introduced a policy
that will reduce labour taxes paid by ﬁrms by 40 billion euros, paid for by
increased taxes on individuals and public spending cuts. But perhaps the largest
instrument of industrial support has been ﬁnancial repression, as central banks
have lent vast sums at very low interest rates to ‘private’ banks—representing a
form of subsidy to such banks. In the energy sector they have offered guaranteed
prices, backed by the state. More generally, various forms of ‘off-balance sheet’
schemes (such as public–private partnerships or ﬁnancing) have seen state
support and investment moved out of visible government budgets, although
risks and potential liabilities remain with the state.
A second state role in markets is inﬂuencing their structure. National legal
monopolies were a major traditional instrument to do this. Such monopolies
have greatly declined, especially in network industries. However, governments
use other policy instruments, some long-standing but others new. Even when
opened up to competition, some markets require licences. Their allocation can
be subject to ‘political interference’ as processes such as mobile telecommu-
nications licensing shows (Thatcher 2005), often involving favouring selected
suppliers. Moreover, governments can strongly inﬂuence the nature of com-
petition, by decisions about how many and which ﬁrms are key players in
markets. They may allocate public contracts to favoured ﬁrms, an instrument
that has become more important as contracting out of public services has
spread. Thus even in the UK, which claims to promote competition, a small
number of inside companies dominate certain markets, and continue to do so
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even if their record is poor (the most notable examples are in large IT
projects). In France, ‘private’ national ﬁrms such as Bouygues or Vinci depend
heavily on major public contracts for which competition has been limited.
Political executives have also played highly visible roles in restructuring of
ﬁrms, notably through mergers and acquisitions, sometimes through deciding
sales and alliances, and sometimes through providing political support. There
are many examples, which span ‘statist’ countries such as France (e.g. the
marriage between GDF and Suez, or the creation of EADS under the
1997–2002 centre-left government of Lionel Jospin) to ‘liberal market econ-
omies’ such as the UK (for instance, the sale of TSB from the nationalized
Lloyds bank to the Coop and then pressure on the latter to buy Lloyds
branches). In Italy, the Berlusconi government prevented a takeover of Alitalia
by Air France in 2008, and the previous Prodi government steered Telecom
Italia towards an alliance with Telefonica to prevent an obvious and complete
overseas takeover. Even the growth of EU regulation may not prevent gov-
ernments continuing to build powerful national or international champions.
Thus an analysis of three major sectors—banking, energy, and telecommuni-
cations between 1990 and 2009—showed that almost all mergers were among
European ﬁrms and very few involved non-EU takeovers; moreover, several
major mergers saw historic incumbent suppliers who enjoy close links with
governments taking over other suppliers, yet these were approved by the
European Commission (Thatcher 2014).
In terms of the operation of markets, political executives continue to enjoy
and use direct formal and informal powers over key outcomes, including in
domains delegated to IRAs. The most visible powers held by ministers are to
set certain tariffs openly in several countries (e.g. for regulated energy prices
for consumers in France, where on frequent occasions they have ignored the
recommendations of the IRA based on economic formulae). Equally, ‘infor-
mal’ pressure can be exerted. This was seen in the UK in 2013–14, when a
political row over rises in electricity prices by the six largest privately owned
suppliers led to the opposition Labour Party promising a price freeze, parlia-
mentary debates and committee scrutiny, and ﬁnally some limits on price
rises. Finally, taxes and subsidies continue to play major roles. Thus for
example, governments have inﬂuenced pricing decisions through altering
‘green levies’ on energy prices.
However, less visible powers have also been derived from newer instru-
ments in many European countries. One source are licence conditions, which
governments can strongly inﬂuence. Thus for instance, in the ‘liberal’ UK, the
government is preparing long-term energy supply licences for nuclear energy
suppliers with minimum prices (‘strike prices’) that are double current levels
to last thirty-ﬁve years. Equally, licence conditions contain redistributive
measures (contrary to the regulatory state hypothesis that regulation is now
centred on ensuring competitive markets), notably ‘social tariffs’ for poorer
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users of electricity, water, and even banking, or requirements of universal
coverage of countries at the same tariffs or limits on the cut-off of water or
other utility services in the face of non-payment.
Many detailed powers are now exercised by IRAs and other non-
majoritarian institutions such as independent central banks (Thatcher and
Stone Sweet 2002). These are of course part of the state, and hence represent
part of its policies to shape markets. Although they are new organizations, they
also represent a form of administrative instrument for elected politicians, who
can seek to use them for aims such as increasing expertise, credible commit-
ment, or blame-shifting. Frequently their aims are set out in legislation.
However, the establishment of such non-majoritarian institutions has not
always meant a reduction in the direct powers of elected politicians and
executives. For a start, the latter can set policy objectives for IRAs, even if
they allow choice over the means of achieving these. The clearest examples are
when governments set inﬂation goals for the independent central bank or
guidance on social and environmental questions to IRAs (both of which apply
in the UK). Moreover, elected politicians have used instruments of adminis-
trative reorganization to modify the institutional position of IRAs and central
banks, rather than taking detailed decisions themselves. The institutional
reforms have at times been major—for instance, merging IRAs or modifying
their aims, duties, and powers. Hence for example, the architecture of ﬁnancial
regulation in the UK was signiﬁcantly altered in 2013 as the Financial Services
Authority (FSA) was abolished and replaced with two new bodies—the Fi-
nancial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority located
within the Bank of England, which was given major new roles and duties in
ﬁnancial stability and regulating banking. Alteration of institutional structures
has often been an instrument for altering the operation of markets—for
example, altering policies towards ﬁnancial ﬁrms by changing the existence
and distribution of powers among ﬁnancial regulatory institutions. Finally,
both IRAs and independent central banks in practice interact and cooperate
closely with governments, features revealed most clearly after the economic
crisis of 2007/8. The non-majoritarian bodies can perform functions that
previously governments undertook, such as rescuing ﬁrms or supporting
demand and lending, often in cooperation with them. Thus formal delegation
to non-majoritarian bodies may offer elected politicians a new agent through
which to seek to inﬂuence markets.
Another vital source of powers over market outcomes is supranational
regulation, notably by the EU. This may seem paradoxical, especially in the
context of claims that nation-states have lost powers. Although the regulatory
state literature has presented the EU as separate from national governments,
in fact much EU regulation is made through their active participation, both in
the Council of Ministers and through committees. Equally, the ECB is com-
posed of national central bank governors who are usually nominated by
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political executives. The economic crisis of 2007/8 also revealed the ﬂimsiness
of distinctions between monetary policy, ﬁscal policy, and ﬁnancial regulation,
and the need for the ‘independent’ ECB to cooperate with national govern-
ments. Thus the ECB’s strategy of preserving the euro has required alterations
of banking regulation, such as establishing bank winding-up procedures, and
transfer of powers to the ECB, which need assistance and often agreement
from national governments. Preserving the euro may also be strongly linked to
national governments introducing domestic reforms; cases such as Greece or
Italy (where the ECB sent detailed instructions in 2011 about reforms as a quid
pro quo for support for Italian bonds), representing a far cry from a separation
of competition-based regulation and redistributive (party) politics. Indeed, the
EU can offer new instruments and sources for elected policymakers in at least
two ways. First, they may ‘upload’ their preferences to the EU level, where new
regulation is passed. Second, the EU may provide a source of apparently
‘external’ legitimation and impetus for national governments to shape mar-
kets. EU regulation also typically provides considerable discretion for member
states, especially when it takes the legal form of directives, which are binding as
to objectives but not means, typically very general, and which must be
transposed into domestic legislation.
In terms of the fourth role of government—planning—traditional national
‘plans’ or grands projets in countries such as France, set by governments with
planning organizations and publicly proclaimed aggregate targets, have
largely ended in Western countries (cf. Hayward 1995). However, govern-
ments, sometimes in cooperation with IRAs, continue to engage in long-
term planning—for example, in terms of the energy industry in terms of the
balance between nuclear and non-nuclear sources; even the supposedly
‘liberal’ UK government has developed plans lasting over thirty years,
including prices, investment, and government-encouraged and selected
consortia, to encourage ﬁrms to build new nuclear power stations. Similarly,
they have set priorities and investment in railway projects—not just new
high-speed trains in France but also the contentious HS2 (High Speed 2)
project in the UK. They also seek long-term foreign direct investment,
through mechanisms ranging from subsidies (direct or indirect through
tax concessions) to ‘passive investment’, notably from foreign sovereign
wealth funds and state-owned enterprises. One example is the UK’s strategy
to bring in the state-owned French electricity supplier EDF and Chinese state
investors into the ﬁnancing and building of new nuclear power stations.
Moreover, state ofﬁcials have played direct roles in (re)shaping markets not
only in ‘statist’ countries such as France, but also in supposedly ‘liberal’
markets such as the UK and US. In several domains, these supposedly
‘liberal’ states have been recognized as highly active, if not illiberal (King
1987, 1999, Gamble 1988). Indeed, the US has been seen as pursuing forms
of industrial policy through forms of state-sponsored research (Block 2008).
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Although rarely trumpeted as grands projets, the state is in fact seeking to
engage in long-term national planning.
This chapter does not examine the effectiveness of the state’s new instru-
ments nor of its direct role. However, it is noteworthy that contrary to the
claims of the ‘regulatory state’ literature, the state is engaged in different forms
of redistribution. Sometimes this takes place through regulatory instruments,
such as regulated and unregulated tariffs or through levies or social obligations
(e.g. limits on cutting off water or other supplies to certain groups or low-cost
tariffs or services, or through national pricing). However, when subsidies are
used there is direct redistribution. The largest after 2008 has been to the
ﬁnancial sector through bailouts, as well as lending at very low interest rates.
The continuing roles of the state in markets and the range of old and new
instruments are summarized in Table 9.3
ANALYSING THE CONTINUING ROLE OF THE STATE
How and why has the state, and especially the political executive, continued to
play a direct role in the shaping of markets in terms of ownership, powers, and
functions, or even seen that role expanded? Why have the rhetoric and aims of
‘rolling back the state’ of the 1970s and 1980s been largely abandoned, and
instead new instruments for state action added to older ones?
Hood (1994) sets out four explanations for reversals in economic policy:
new competitors and predators (institutions and interests), economists’ ideas,
habitat, and self-destruction (cyclical movements). Each can be applied to
offer processes and elements of explanation for the modiﬁed nature of the
state in shaping economic markets. They offer different lines of analysis for an
initial enquiry.
Table 9.3 State roles and direct instruments for shaping markets





Internationalized SOEs; state guarantees;
SWFs; state-required private funding;
ﬁnancial repression; tax competition
Inﬂuencing market
structure




Price controls; use of
state-owned
enterprises
Reregulation of competition by IRAs or




Long-term planning National plans Long-term contracts
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In terms of altered interests, pressures on politicians to ‘act’ through direct
state action have remained or reappeared in times of crisis. As King andWood
(1999) argue, a political economy analysis needs to include both the pressures
and constraints arising from economic imperatives of ensuring the health of
ﬁrms, and also the political imperatives of winning and maintaining ofﬁce.
Both sets of factors have given rise to powerful forces on elected politicians.
Large ﬁrms, including supposedly privately owned ones, have pressed
governments for protection from competition, funding, and planning. Thus
for instance, banks or car companies have lobbied for support, ranging from
traditional subsidies to new indirect forms of support. Equally, business
associations have sought long-term contracts both to ensure reliable sources
of future revenue for suppliers and also to provide infrastructure (be this
physical such as railways or airports, or communications and energy) for
companies. Such state action has remained even in liberal market economies—
indeed, as King and Wood (1999: 375) point out, the weaknesses of coordi-
nating mechanisms ‘imply a greater role for governments in determining
supply-side outcomes’.
Elected politicians have also faced electoral and popular demands to inﬂu-
ence or counterbalance the operation of markets. Thus for instance, despite
privatization of suppliers and delegation of regulatory powers to IRAs, gov-
ernments have not been able to delegate responsibility (and blame—cf. Hood
2002, 2011) for increased energy prices, especially in times of falling real
incomes, including in supposedly ‘liberal’ polities such as the UK and
US. Political parties, including those on the right, have returned to ‘statist’
rhetoric and instruments, from Sarkozy’s calls for state leadership to
Cameron’s ‘Big Society’ action through links to the third sector. On the
centre-left, politicians such as Obama or François Hollande have seen oppor-
tunities to attack the retreat of the state. However, politicians have found
themselves hemmed in by institutional and especially economic constraints,
notably ﬁscal limits. Hence unsurprisingly, they have turned to new instru-
ments, particularly those that are off central government balance sheets such
as state guarantees or providing lending to ﬁrms from ‘private’ banks through
state-agreed or imposed lending requirements or incentives. Equally, being
unable or unwilling to fund certain services, they have sought to use licence
conditions to provide such services.
A third powerful group arises from within the state itself. Unelected public
ofﬁcials have been vital actors in state activity—be this in terms of protecting
what they view as ‘the public interest’, expanding their powers, or protecting
their popularity—and provides a related factor. IRAs and other non-
majoritarian institutions have sometimes found increased direct action by
political executives useful—in legitimating or taking unpopular decisions.
Indeed, often a direct role for political executives has gone hand in hand
with an increased role for non-majoritarian institutions such as IRAs.
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Altered habitat also offers valuable clues to explain the state’s continued
roles but altered mixture of instruments in shaping markets. Its force has been
revealed particularly clearly by the economic crisis after 2007 (cf. Gamble
2009, Grant and Wilson 2012, Coen and Roberts 2012), although many
features existed before then. Economic conditions in the 1980s and 1990s
that favoured the state reducing its direct role in supporting ﬁrms and electors,
such as reasonable economic growth, high private sector demand, a booming
ﬁnancial sector, cheap oil prices, and falling raw material costs, have been
reversed since the 2000s. Financial crisis and higher commodity prices have
led to political and economic forces on elected politicians to use new, and
often direct, policy instruments to sustain markets. The changing position of
the banking sector has been crucial here: governments have needed to rescue
ﬁnancial ﬁrms but equally importantly, have faced powerful pressures to
provide ﬁnancial support to other actors to replace the traditional banking
sector. Caught between these powerful pressures and ﬁscal constraints (them-
selves in part due to low growth and banking costs for public budgets),
governments have turned to instruments such as state guarantees, state
requirements on banks to lend, or new sovereign wealth funds and public
investment banks aid markets but do not increase direct state debt. Equally,
the great recession has created powerful pressures on incomes, to which
governments have responded with reregulatory measures concerning prices
or licence conditions that do not cost ‘public money’. Poor economic per-
formance has increased the need for governments to both aid ﬁrms and to act
as a ‘compensatory state’, both in terms of the labour market and for ﬁrm
support, acting through indirect instruments (cf. Schmidt 2009).
Ideational explanations might seem highly surprising, given the resilience of
neoliberal ideas (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013). But such ideas are not hostile to
state action—indeed, they require state action, including direct action to create
and support ‘competitive markets’, prevent market power, and limit trade
unions (cf. Gamble 2013, 1988). Moreover, neoliberal ideas have proven
highly ﬂexible, being adapted to crisis to justify state action and new instru-
ments such as disguised bank subsidies and bailouts (cf. Schmidt and Woll
2013, Jones 2013). The plasticity of neoliberalism has offered a good cover for
state action, even as the rhetoric of state ‘non-interference’ in ‘the market’ has
continued. Moreover, even the dominant ideas in economics have begun to
alter, especially after the 2007 economic crisis. Some ideas are revivals of older
ones (e.g. neo-Keynesian views—cf. Stiglitz 2010, Krugman 2012), while
others appear novel (e.g. ‘behavioural economics’), but they all underline the
limits of markets and the need for state action, notably through ensuring
funding for investment and regulation of behaviour. Some works have
achieved mass popularity and hence directly entered political discourse and
debate, or have even led to policy units and recommendations (e.g. the concept
of ‘nudging’—Thaler and Sunstein 2008).
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Finally, cyclical factors provide a powerful set of explanatory processes.
Policy can be endogenous, and hence changes in the state’s role often arises
from the very nature of ‘neoiberal’ economic policies. One mechanism may be
through altering the environment of policy, which then creates pressures for
state responses. Thus for instance, the increased ﬁnancialization of the econ-
omy played a major role in the economic crisis after 2007/8, which the state
has had to face (or accept economic disintegration), including through (re)
nationalization and ﬁnancial support. Equally, ending public ownership in
network industries has allowed the creation of privately owned oligopolies
driven by short-term proﬁtability, which then raised prices and created pol-
itical unpopularity as well as strong reasons for state action to preserve long-
term investment and security of supply. A second mechanism can be the
policy lessons learned from the successes and failures of attempts to ‘roll back
the state’, be this ‘rational’ learning or forms of blame avoidance and legitim-
ation of pre-existing strategies (cf. Howlett 2012). Hence, for example, initial
hopes of ‘deregulation’ of network industries such as energy and telecommu-
nications were soon followed by ‘learning’ that competition and important
social objectives such as protection of poorer consumers required reregulation;
hence far from ending state action, governments have given greater powers to
independent regulatory agencies and taken direct powers for themselves (cf.
Vogel 1996, Thatcher 1999). Finally, initial policies to ‘drive back’ the state
have had the unintended consequences of allowing or encouraging new forms
of state action. Hence privatization has had the paradoxical effect of allowing
state-owned ﬁrms to expand—for example, EDF’s internationalization has
involved buying recently privatized overseas suppliers. Equally, ﬁnancializa-
tion combined with high energy and raw material prices as well as the
liberalization of international capital, have permitted countries to establish
sovereign wealth funds, which then represent the return of state ownership
(albeit in new guises and with new owners).
CONCLUSION
How does the view of the state presented here differ from that of the more
‘indirect’ or ‘steering’ state, especially the varieties of capitalism models or the
regulatory state model? It certainly accepts that as the varieties of capitalism
models suggest, the state supports ﬁrms, and that we can see diverse patterns
in the instruments through which it does so. Equally, differences among types
of capitalism can be identiﬁed in terms of state features such as the extent of
public ownership or the spread and features of IRAs. It also accepts that many
of the features of the regulatory state have spread, as regulatory activity
has grown. In terms of the state, this means changes such as the creation of
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non-majoritarian institutions such as IRAs, and the extension of supra-
national regulation.
However, the chapter also suggests that if we separate strategies or roles and
instruments, then a different picture emerges. In terms of markets, it continues
its roles of providing services and funding, seeking to inﬂuence market struc-
tures and outcomes, and engaging in long-term planning. However, this does
not mean a replication or return to 1960s or 1970s industrial policy or grands
projets—at the very least, the rhetoric of policy differs and current policies are
more internationalized, and the mix of policy instruments used differ. More-
over, direct state structures, activities, and functions in shaping markets are
layered on to those of the regulatory state. The result is the combination of many
traditional policy instruments, albeit in decline, such as direct public ownership
of suppliers or subsidies, indirect ‘regulatory’ instruments recognized by the
literature on the regulatory state, and newer, more direct instruments.
Political and economic imperatives continue in advanced democracies for
the state to shape markets. The state continues to pursue strategies of sup-
porting ﬁrms and seeking to gain sufﬁcient political support for elected
politicians. The combination of instruments used for so doing has been
modiﬁed, and analyses can examine changes in interests (ﬁrms, electors,
politicians, or state ofﬁcials), ideas, the economic environment, or the results
of past policies. Yet the most important conclusion may be that despite claims
of a move towards a more indirect state dominated by non-majoritarian
institutions, elected politicians and their ofﬁcials remain central and continue
to seek to (re)shape economic markets directly, features that have become
more evident since the crises after 2000.
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